



LSE Research Online 
 






State transformation, reforms and economic 
performance in China, 1840–1910  
 
 
Originally published as: 
Teichova, Alice and Matis, Herbert (Eds), Nation, state and the economy 
in history.  Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 308-
331 © 2003 Cambridge University Press.      
 
You may cite this version as:  
Deng, Kent (2003). State transformation, reforms and economic 
performance in China, 1840–1910 [online]. London: LSE Research 
Online.  
Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000640  
Available online: February 2006 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of 
the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for 
non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute 
the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. 
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript version of the book section, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the review process.  Some differences 
between this version and the publisher’s version may remain.  You are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
The book is currently available in the LSE collection and is shelved at HD82 






Contact LSE Research Online at: Library.Researchonline@lse.ac.uk2003: ‘State Transformation, Reforms and Economic Performance in China, 1840–1910’, in 
Nation, State, and the Economy in History, Chapter 16 (pp. 308–31). Cambridge University 
Press. Editors: Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis. 
 
 
State Transformation, Reforms and Economic Performance 
in China, 1840–1910 
 
Kent G. Deng 
 
 
The period immediately after the Opium War (1840–42) marked the first stage of state 
transformation and economic reforms in modern China. During this period, the age-old socio-
political and socio-economic structures and equilibria ended and new structures gradually 
took shape. Despite political hiccups, including the erosion of China’s sovereignty, the 
market worked its own way out and modern growth began. 
 
I. CHINA’S EARLY SUCCESS AND A CHANGE IN THE RULES OF THE GAME 
 
a. China’s superiority 
 
  China was a success story of pre-modern economic growth. Its socio-economic structure 
was flexible enough to expand across four time zones over 10,000,000 km2, reaching the 
physical limits for an agrarian civilisation. Its economy was productive enough to generate 
the surplus to finance Confucian education, science and technology, a bureaucratic machine 
controlling over 1,000 counties, an army of one million men, gigantic public works (eg. the 
Great Wall and Grand Canal) and to sustain a remarkable degree of urbanisation, a nation-
wide market and extensive foreign trade. 
  In terms of inventions and innovations, the Chinese almost certainly held the world record 
by the eve of the European Renaissance with a long list of claims including metallurgy, 
gunpowder, the compass, stirrups, silk, porcelain, paper making and paper currency, block 
printing, mechanical clocks, examinations to recruit civil servants, to name just a few.  
1   China's production capacity was reflected by its export pattern. Until the end of the 
eighteenth century, China remained the main supplier of porcelain wares to the rest of the 
world.
1 Up to the end of the nineteenth century China was the main supplier of silk and tea to 
the world market. To facilitate foreign trade, by the end of the nineteenth century, China had 
over 10,000 compradors, with an aggregate wealth of 18,400 metric tons of silver, averaging 
1.84 tons per head of the group.
2 Chinese diasporas spread far and widely in Asia long before 
the Europeans with sophisticated trading networks.
3
  China’s wealth was crystallised by its possession of largest reserves of monetary silver in 
the world.
4 Having the large quantities of monetary silver for such a long period not only 
enabled China to establish a silver standard but also caused a price revolution.
5
  Behind its deliberately preserved extravagant and mighty façade, the ‘Confucian state’ was 
small and cheap with limited devices for and influence on the economy.
6 The functions of 
that state were to (1) promote Confucian values for social stability, (2) promote and regulate 
economic activities for tax revenue, (3) provide public goods: national defence and internal 
law and order, key infrastructure (such as the Grand Canal and public granaries) and 
emergency relief (against famine and violent price fluctuations). The underlying financial 
policy of the Chinese state was a balanced budget. The government revenue was merely 1–2 
percent of China’s total GDP.
7 Even so, the Qing suffered a chronic shortfall of 15 percent of 
its revenue target.
8
  Understandably, as China seemed to reach a Pareto optimum, the opportunity costs for a 
change in production function were too high. Until the nineteenth century, any such change 
could cost China’s long-held supremacy. 
 
b. A Change in the Rules of the Game 
 
  The conflict between the Qing state and the West occurred as the former struggled to 
maintain its grip on China’s exports established in 1760. The corner-stone of this monopoly 
was the employment of ‘chartered maritime merchants’ at Canton. Huge sums were yielded 
for the Empire.  
  As China’s door for trade was never closed but monopolised, the West had two hurdles to 
overcome: its own trade deficits and the Qing monopoly. It was a hopeless task until opium 
was discovered as an equaliser in trading with China. Soon, China’s tea export was offset by 
opium instead of silver. Not only that, in 1817–19, for the first time, China had a trade deficit 
2 with Britain–India. From then on, China’s hard-earned silver began to flow out at a speed 
much faster than imports of the metal during the previous periods. The Canton-Cohong 
system tumbled as trade surpluses were no longer guaranteed. 
  The response of the Qing state was to ban the opium trade. It was a passive measure trying 
to stifle opium trade at home rather than enhancing China’s monopolistic supply overseas. As 
Britain had too much to lose from the opium sales, the ban triggered the invasion of the 
British gun-ships.
9 The rules of the game were unilaterally changed by the West from 
peaceful market exchange (in which the West had comparative advantage) to armed 
confrontation (in which the West possessed force majeure).  
  The gamble paid off. In 1842, the Nanking Treaty was signed. Opium was legalised. The 
British had free access to China’s market with their property rights protected. As the icing of 
the cake, China was also made to pay crippling reparations as a punishment for being a 
loser.
10 The two hurdles were cleared for good.  
  The benefit from the change of rules was so great that resorting to force to settle a dispute 
with China became the norm. Japan became addicted to it and waged more wars against 
China than all the other powers put together.  
 
II. THE NANKING TREATY REFORM AND STATE TRANSFORMATION 
 
  Regardless of the brutality of the Opium War, a reform was swiftly carried out which can 
be called as the ‘Nanking Treaty Reform’ (NTR). Mercantilistic in nature, many changes 
took place and some were revolutionary. 
  First, China’s jealously-guarded domestic markets were systematically opened up with 44 
main ports for foreigners.
11 Foreign dominance in China’s foreign trade and investment in 
railways became reality (Tables 1–3).  
 
Table 1. Shares of Import and Export Tonnages, 1873–1910
12
 
Year  Foreign (I)  Chinese (II)  I:II 
 
1873 98%  2%  49.0 
1882 73%  27%  2.7 
1892 79%  21%  3.8 
3 1902 83%  17%  4.9 
1910 84%  16%  5.3 





Table 2. Investment Shares in Railways, 1888–1946
13
 
Sector  Total  Foreign (I)  Chinese (II)  I:II 
 (Private)  (Government) 
No. Projects  90  76  14  (10)  (4)  5.4 
% in total  100.0  84.5  15.5  (11.1)  (4.4) 
Sum*   1,398,235,438  1,078,932,172 319,303,266  (299,681,530) (19,621,736)  3.4 
% in Total  100.0  77.2  22.8  (21.4)  (1.4) 
 
Note: *Converted with period exchange rates. 
 
Table 3. Foreign Control over Railways, c. 1918
14
 
Powers    Length (in km)   % in Total 
 
Western    13,980 88.6 
Asian   1,792  11.4 
Total   15,772*  100.0 
 
 
Note: This is at least 90 percent of China’s aggregate railway length.
15
 
  Second, the political control of the state began to crack as foreign spheres of influence 
functioned as alternative power centres. It was no accident that a decade after the Opium War 
rebellions such as the Taiping so seriously challenged the Qing rule that the Beijing 
government only survived with financial and military assistance from the West (see Table 4). 
In the final twist, the treaties made the state pro-Western. 
4  
5 Table 4. Government Foreign Debts, 1861–98
16
 
Year  Purpose  Sum (in Silver Liang)  Debtor  Annual interest (%) 
 
1861–66 Counter-Taipings  1,609,925*†  Foreign merchants in JS, FJ and GD  ? 
1867–68 Counter-Muslem  Rebellion  2,200,000*  Foreign merchants in SH  18.0 
1874 Taiwan  defence  2,000,000§ British  bank  8.0 
1875 Counter-Muslem  Rebellion  3,000,000† British  banks  10.5 
1877–78 Counter-Muslem  Rebellion  6,750,000§ British  bank  15.0 
1883–85 Coastal  defence  13,602,300§ British  bank  9.0 
1886 Naval  updating#  980,000§ German  bank  5.5 
1887–88 Flood  control  1,968,800*† British  bank  7.0 
1893–95  Coastal defence (1)  42,090,000§¶  British and German banks  6.0–7.0 
1895–96  War reparation to Japan  200,000,000¶  French and Russian banks  4.0–5.0 
Total    274,201,025 (10,227.7 metric tons) 
 
Note: * Loans for 2 years. † Loans for 2–5 years. § loans for 6–19 years. ¶ Loans for 20 years and over. # Fund abused for 
the Summer Palace. JS–Jiangsu. FJ–Fujian. GD–Guangdong. SH–Shanghai. 
 
  Third, with the decline of the agricultural sector as the dominant revenue-earner and the 
rise in importance of commerce, the old tax structure became obsolete (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Unlike taxes from the agricultural sector which were dictated by fluctuations in population 
and farming land, the revenue from customs duties was determined by trade performance. A 
rapid increase in duties marked an unmistakably intensive, market-driven growth. A turning 
point was reached in 1903–4 when for the first time in Chinese history customs duty revenue 
surpassed revenue from taxes on agriculture. This ushered in an era of mercantilism as the 
state increasingly relied on commerce to maintain its function. 
 
6 Table 5. Old Tax Structure (in Silver-Liang), 1652–1766
17
 
Type  Land and Poll  Grain*  I  Salt  Customs  Other  II  I:II 
 
1652 21,260,000  8,430,000   2,120,000  1,000,000  –   9.52 
   (5,620,000  shi)   
Share in total  64.80%  25.69%  90.49  6.46%  3.05%  – 9.51 
1682 26,340,000  9,510,000   2,760,000  2,000,000  –   7.53 
   (6,340,000  shi)   
Share in total  64.86%  23.42%  88.28  6.80%  4.92%  – 11.72 
1766 32,910,000  12,476,700   5,740,000  5,400,000 4,490,000    2.90 
   (8,317,800  shi)   
Share in total  53.93%  20.45%  74.38  9.41%  8.85%  7.36%  25.62 
 
 
Note: I) Taxes specifically from agriculture. II) Taxes on the whole economy. *In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries , 
the average price of rice was 0.94–2.18 liang per shi in the Yangzi Delta
18
 and 1.03–1.93 liang per shi in Guangdong 
and Guangxi.
19
 Hence, a mean value of 1.5 liang per shi is used for estimation. 
 
Table 6. New Tax Structure (in Silver-Liang), 1820–1910
20
 
 I  II  I:II 
Year Agricultural  Taxes*  Customs Duties    Tax-payers  Farming land† 
   Index  Index  Index  Index 
1820 30,206,144  100  2,932,796§ 100  10.3  353,377,694  100  779,321,984  100 
1825  – –  – –  –  379,885,340  108  – – 
1830  – –  – –  –  394,784,681  112  – – 
1835  – –  – –  –  401,767,053  114  – – 
1840  – –  – –  –  12,814,828  117  – – 
1845 30,213,800  100  – –  –  421,342,730  119  – – 
1850  – –  – –  –  429,913,134  122  – – 
(1851  – –  – –  –  –  –  756,386,244  97) 
1855  – –  – –  –  318,845,752 90  – – 
7 1860  – –  – –  –  –  –  – – 
1865  – –  8,245,394  281  –  260,697,717 74  – – 
1870  – – 10,041,826  342  –  271,793,461 77  – – 
(1873 –  –  11,257,824  384  –  –  –  756,631,857  97) 
1875 –  –  12,893,471  440  –  305,014,000¶  86 –  – 
          368,063,232 104  
1880 –  –  14,692,208  501  –  288,559,000# 82  –  – 
          368,153,866 104 
1885  32,356,768 107  14,056,914 479  2.3  295,881,000**   84 –  – 
          358,036,060 101 
(1887  32,792,627 109  16,411,544 560  2.0 377,636,000  107 911,976,606  117) 
1890  33,736,023 112  19,100,657 651    333,242,000††  94 –  – 
          380,717,468 108 
1895 –  –  20,694,712  706  –  332,336,000§§  94 –  – 
          379,682,395 107 
(1898 –  –  22,976,817  783  –  319,719,000¶¶  90 –  –) 
          367,324,219 104 
1900  – – 24,456,571  834  –  –  –  – – 
(1903 28,086,771 93  27,659,313  943  1.0  –  –  – –) 
(1904 –  –  28,132,456  959  –  –  –  –  –) 
1905  – – 30,965,612  1056  –  –  –  – – 
1910  – – 35,340,714  1205  –  –  –  – – 
(1912  – –  – –  –  368,146,520  104  –  –) 
 
 
Note: Entries in parentheses are supplementary to show continuation of the data. Italicised numbers are estimates weighted 
to include the missing provinces.
21
 *Including the Land–Poll Combined Tax, Grain–to–Cash Conversion (liangzhe) 
and Silver Loss Discount (haoxian). †In mu. §Estimated figure based on the highest share of the customs duty revenue 
(8.85%) during 1652–1766. ¶No data for seven provinces (Anhui, Shaanxi, Gansu, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Guangxi and 
Yunnan). #No data for nine provinces (Jilin, Anhui, Shaanxi, Gansu, Xinjiang, Fujian, Taiwan, Guangxi and Yunnan). 
**No data for eight provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Xinjiang, Fujian, Taiwan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou). ††No data 
for six provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Guangxi and Yunnan). §§No data for six provinces (Anhui, 
8 Gansu, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Guangxi and Yunnan). ¶¶No data for eight provinces (Jilin, Anhui, Gansu, Xinjiang, Fujian, 
Taiwan, Guangxi and Yunnan).  
 
III. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE NTR  
 
a. Market-driven growth  
 
  First of all, with the 44 main trading ports open to foreigners, the savings were enormous. 
Under the Canton–Cohong system, tea produced in Fujian had to travel some 1,400 
kilometers south before being exported. The cost of inland transport accounted for one-third 
of the free on board (FOB) price. The opening of Fujian allowed an astonishing total saving 
of 600,000 liang of silver (22.4 metric tons) per year for the buyers from the annual 150,000 
dan tea trade.
22
 Second, foreign trade rapidly proliferated across the empire. Most noticeable were (1) 
around 1899 opium imports dropped from the early 44.5 to 13.8 percent of China’s total 
imports in value (partly because after the opium trade was legalised, home-grown supply of 
the drug substituted imports;
23 and (2) China’s tea and silk exports rocketed (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Rise in Teaa and Silkb Exports
24



















  A .D. 
 
9  
Note: aIn 100,000 jin. bIn 10,000 jin. 
 
 In terms of the total volume and value of foreign trade, the increase was spectacular. 
According to the Nanking Treaty, the ceiling for the customs duties was set at five percent. 
Although this rate was re-endorsed by the 1858 Tianjin Treaty, with numerous concessions 
and duty-free treatments, the actual rate after 1858 was only three percent.
25 Thus, it is safe to 
use the ceiling five percent to estimate the total value of trade with the formula Vi =  
 Ci 
 r   , 
where Vi is the total value of goods traded during period i; Ci, the aggregate customs duties 
paid during period i; and r, the ceiling duty rate (2.8 percent before 1842
26). The following 
result is derived from the data in previous Table 6: 
 
  Year  Value in silver liang      (in metric ton)  Value index 
  1820 104,742,714  (3,906.9)  100 
 1861 110,465,280    (4,120.4)  105 
 1871 215,676,120    (8,044.7)  206 
 1881 301,694,420    (11,253.2)  288 
 1891 402,676,620    (15,019.8)  384 
 1901 437,310,820    (16,311.7)  418 
 1910 706,814,280    (26,364.2)  675 
 
  There was also a hidden factor. With the rise of the opium trade, a rapid silver drain from 
China caused severe deflation in the early nineteenth century. In 1838, the exchange rate of 
one liang of silver rose from the previous official par of 1,000 bronze coins to 1,600. It rose 
further to 2,300 coins in 1845 and 4,000 coins in 1899 with the average deflationary rate of 
1.4 percent over the period of a century.
27 Thus, the real growth index for the total volume of 
foreign trade has to be much greater than the value index:  
 
  Year  Volume index (1820 price) 
 1820  100 
 1861  187 
 1871  418 
 1881  672 
10  1891  1,031 
 1901  1,287 
 1910  2,362 
 
Even so, the estimate is conservative as the actual duty rate was lower with the practice of a 
duty free regime. Any such increase means a higher degree of commercialisation. 
  Third, geographically, Guangzhou’s importance in foreign trade was surpassed by Jiangsu, 
where the new trading centre Shanghai was located. Foreign trade also penetrate into China’s 
interior (see Table 7). The whole development was dictated by the market itself. 
 
Table 7. Percentage Shares of Customs Duties, 1861–1910
28
 
   I  II  III  IV 
Year DB  HeB  AH  JS  ZJ  FJ  GD  HuB HN JX GX SC  YN  Total 
1861  –  1.81  –  41.66  7.41  18.28  30.84  – – – –  – –  100.00 
1865  2.10  4.16 –  31.49 5.14 26.70 13.45 10.78 –  6.18 –  –  –  100.00 
1870  2.67  4.17 –  32.69 7.18 22.42 12.07 13.39 –  5.41 –  –  –  100.00 
1875  1.88  2.85 –  33.40 6.33 22.67 14.05 13.28 –  5.54 –  –  –  100.00 
1880  2.08  2.96 0.31  35.00 4.81 21.68 13.52 14.57 –  5.07 –  –  –  100.00 
1885  2.21  3.08 0.46  32.78 5.23 21.91 14.75 14.06 –  5.52 –  –  –  100.00 
1890  2.09  3.18 2.16  30.83 5.51 17.45 23.26 10.20 –  5.13 0.01  –  0.18  100.00 
1895  0.68  4.18 1.88  38.44 5.98 10.78*  18.26 12.74 –  4.98 0.03  1.60 0.45  100.00 
1900 2.91  3.94† 4.19  37.36  5.32  8.65  17.88  12.14 –  3.74 1.22  1.88 0.77  100.00 
1905  2.81  9.55 3.26  42.27 4.07  6.04 14.15 10.92 0.39 2.12 1.73  1.79 0.90  100.00 
1910  5.59  9.22 1.67  36.39 3.81  4.98 17.02 13.37 0.74 2.15 2.04  2.24 0.78  100.00 
 
Note: I) Far North (Manchuria). II) Northeast. III) Southeast coast. IV) Southwest and South inland. Abbreviations for 
provinces: DB–Dongbei (Manchuria), HeB–Hebei, AH–Anhui, JS–Jiangsu (predominantly Shanghai), ZJ–Zhejiang, 
FJ–Fujian including Taiwan until 1895, GD–Guangdong (Guangzhou only), HuB–Hubei, HN–Hunan, JX–Jiangxi, 
GX–Guangxi, SC–Sichuan, YN–Yunnan. *Point of decline in trade after Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. †-Decline 
due to the Boxer Rebellion. 
 
11  In addition, the shares of customs duties suggest differences in market conditions in 
different zones. Conditions in the West-influenced south were far more favourable than 
Russia-Japan-affected north. This pattern is revealed further in the East China Sea coast: after 
Japan colonised Taiwan in 1895 and extended its influence in on-shore Fujian, Fujian’s 
foreign trade plunged by 50 percent (as at 1910).  
  Fourth, as foreign trade multiplied, a new pattern of a balance of payment developed. China 
no longer held its position as a net goods exporter (see Table 8). This is a clear sign that 
China gradually assimilated to and synchronised with the world economy. 
 
Table 8. Trade Performance (in 106 Silver-Yuan), 1871–1911
29
 
  Total Value Traded    Import (I)    Export (II)    I–II 
Period   Index    Index    Index 
1871–73  216 (216)  100 (100)  106 (106)  100 (100)  110 (110)  100 (100)  +4 (+4) 
1881–83  234 (276)  108 (128)  126 (148)  119 (140)  108 (139)  98 (126)  –18 (–9) 
1891–93  386 (525)  179 (243)  219 (298)  207 (281)  167 (227)  152 (206)  –52 (–71) 
1901–3  784 (1,223)  363 (566)  473 (738)  446 (696)  311 (485)  283 (440)  –162 (–253) 
1909–11  1,272 (2,213)  589 (1,025)  702 (1,221)  662 (1,152)  570 (992)  518 (902)  –133 (–229) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are at the 1871 constant price. 
 
  Fifth, there was a clear trend of railway-induced investment in new industries (see Figures 
2 and 3). 
 






















Note: Contemporary China is taken as a proxy for the Empire. 1) Iron-mining. 2) Coal-mining. 3) Nonferrous metals. 4) Iron 
and steel. 5) Engineering. 6) Textiles. 7) Food-processing. 8) Others. 9) Railway lines. 
 























Note: Contemporary China is taken as a proxy for the Empire. Points: a) Shenyang; b) Tianjin; c) Taiyuan. 1) Iron-mining. 
2) Coal-mining. 3) Nonferrous metals. 4) Iron and steel. 5) Engineering. 6) Textiles. 7) Food-processing. 8) 
Chemicals. 9) Building materials. 10) Others. 11) Railway lines. 12) Dividing line between China proper and Japan-
controlled Manchuria. 
 
14 The railways effectively shifted the centre of industrial gravity from the east coast and the 
Yangzi reaches to a vertical belt with a clear bias towards heavy industry:
32  
 
Table 9. Distribution of Industrial Workers in Regions and Sectors 
 
A.   Region  Workers  % of all workers 
  Shanghai 36,220  46.4 
 Hanko  13,350  17.0 
 Guangzhou  10,300  13.2 
 Tianjin  4,180  5.4 
 Fuzhou  3,240  4.1 
 Nanjing  1,000  1.3 
 Jiujiang  1,000  1.3 
 Shantou  600  0.8 
 Xiamen  500  0.6 
 Other  7,700  9.9 
 Subtotal  78,090  100.0 
 
B. Sector 
  Heavy industry
33 51,700  52.7 
 Light  industry  42,800  43.6 
 Other  3,600  3.7 
 Subtotal  98,100  100.0 
 
 
  Traditional workshops were gradually replaced by modern factories. For example, by 1894 
Chinese private modern filatures in Guangzhou and Shanghai employed 13,600 workers and 
supplied about 70 percent of China’s total silk export.
34 During the same period, private 
cotton-textile factories hired some 6,500 workers, able to produce 96,300 rolls a year for 
marketing.
35 Chinese private investment also found its footing in matches, paper, printing, 
shipbuilding, engineering and machinery. Overall, in 1894, the private sector employed at 
least 28,000 factory workers, about one-third of China’s modern work-force.
36 China’s 
15 modern industries progressed so efficiently in Asia that Japan had to capture them by force 
later to eliminate competition.
37
 
b. Evaluation: Was China simply a victim? 
 
  One of the most visible outcomes of the NTR was the key role played by foreign traders 
and foreign investors (railways and loans being examples) in China’s market (see Tables 1–2, 
7–8). To Marxist–Maoists and nationalists alike, this is the most upsetting sign of foreign 
imperialism. However, foreign control over trade and investment alone does not 
automatically justify the claim that China was a victim of external exploitation. Two 
questions will have to be asked: (1) Given the importance of the customs revenue, who paid 
most of the customs duties and by how much? (2) Were the foreigners the sole beneficiaries 
of the revenue?  
  From Table 10 as well as Table 1, it is obvious that foreigners paid most of the customs 
duties. The data reveal the fact that foreign traders were the main contributor to a ‘second 
budget’ for the Qing. As shown earlier in Table 6, by the turn of the twentieth century, 
revenue from the customs duties matched that from the agricultural sector. Although small in 
number, foreign traders had as much fiscal weight as several hundred millions of farming 
Chinese. 
 





Year  Total *  By foreigners  % in Total  By Chinese  % in Total 
 
1861 1,500,507  1,500,507 100.0  0 0.0 
1866 1,080,148  1,080,148 100.0  0 0.0 
1871 2,143,110  2,143,110 100.0  0 0.0 
1873 1,982,361  1,976,134  99.7  6,227 0.3 
1878 2,175,779  1,990,595  91.5  185,184 8.5 
1883 2,357,503  2,135,413  90.6  222,090 9.4 
1888 3,658,811  3,348,224  91.5  310,587 8.5 
1893 3,674,996  3,288,984  89.5  386,012  10.5 
1898 4,820,657  4,445,212  92.2  375,445 7.8 
16 1903 7,198,990  6,768,598  94.0  430,392 6.0 
1910 7,405,551  6,900,372  93.2  505,179 6.8 
 
 
Note: *Including both import and export duties, in silver liang. 
 
  Another common illusion is that since the Qing state mortgaged China’s customs duties to 
the West, the duty revenue never benefited the Chinese. Quite the opposite. In conjunction 
with Table 10, Figure 4 shows that the lion’s share of the income from customs duties was 
controlled by the Qing state and distributed among seven earmarked funds. The priority was 
given to national defence and internal peace-keeping as one-third of the total income was 
allocated to the military, equivalent to the combined shares for the custom duties, foreign 
debt repayment and war reparations. The moneys kept for the central administration and the 
royals were rather trivial, and certainly not sufficient for excessive rent-seeking by the state. 
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Note: In million liang of silver. Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total. 
 
 
  It is obvious that the new revenue from the customs duties was milked from foreigners but 
used by the Qing state for legitimate purposes. 
  Now it is easy to assess the Maoists’ claim that 1840 marked the beginning of a ‘semi-
colonial’ China, although the term itself has never been clearly defined. The closest thing 
18 was the Japanese puppet regimes of the 1930s–40s in Manchuria and Northeast China proper. 
Thus, China’s semi-colonial status occurred much later and did not last long. 
  It is worth noting that foreign powers came to China with very different purposes. As the 
Westerners approached China to trade for profit, the Russians and Japanese like opportunistic 
scavengers came to loot China after it was badly injured. This is clearly reflected by their 
appetite for China’s plentiful territory and wealth. By 1911, Russia and Japan grabbed in all 
three million square kilometres, or 15 percent of the Qing territory. In 1895 Japan demanded 
an astronomical war reparation of 230 million liang of silver (8,580 metric tons), a sum over 
10 times greater than all the previous reparations from China put together.
41 If anything, in its 
entire modern history, China fell victim primarily to Russo-Japanese colonialism. 
 
III. OTHER REFORMS AND THE DEMISE OF THE QING 
 
a. Voluntary reform: the ‘Westernisation Movement’ 
 
  Despite China’s humiliating experience with Western demands, the NTR represented the 
first step of a long line of reforms in post-Opium War History. The most influential one was 
the 1870–95 ‘Westernisation Movement’, aimed at rebuilding China’s military strength and 
thus sovereignty. By now, with newly-established confidence and financial resources, the 
Qing state appeared proto-Gerschenkronian as it dismantled remaining trade barriers, 
promoted modern industries and initiated technological dissemination. 
  With the priority to build a modern arms industry with naval hardware, between 1861 and 
1910, a quarter of the Qing military expenditure was invested in the arms industry (totaling 
72,300,000 liang of silver or 2,696.8 metric tons). Western technicians were hired and capital 
goods imported. The first modern gunboat was built in 1868, which marked a new era of 
import substitution industrial growth (ISI).
42 By 1890, the number of government-sponsored 
ordnance factories had grown to 19 with a work-force of some 11,000, some 10 percent of 
China’s modern work-force.
43 Between 1867 and 1894, the Shanghai Arsenal received a total 
investment of 2,920,000 liang of silver (108.8 metric tons) and developed into a huge 
complex of 13 divisions with 2,821 workers.
44 It was the largest in East Asia and one of the 
largest in the world at that time.
45 By 1894, this arsenal alone had produced in all 561 heavy 
machines, 15 ships, 585 cannons, 563 torpedoes, 51,285 rifles, 158,250 bullets, 1,201,900 
shells, 411,023 artillery shells and 4,081,469 pounds of explosive.
46  
19   In addition, a modern naval academy was established in 1867 in Majiang to train officers 
under several dozen French instructors. Four more were founded in 1880 (Tianjin), 1887 
(Guangdong), 1890 (Nanjing) and 1903 (Yantai).
47 The standard four-year courses included 
English, geography, mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, astronomy, meteorology, 
cartography, steam engine, hydromechanics, calculation of longitude and latitude, reckoning, 
pilotage, artillery, and surveying.
48 Schools were also established to train seamen with skills 
such as the use of cables and knots, handling of sails, steering, use of the compass, rowing, 
swimming, and use of firearms and swords.
49 Moreover, from 1876 onwards, naval cadets 
were sent to foreign naval academies and shipyards in Western Europe, mainly Britain and 
France, to learn the latest technology and craft.
50  
  The result of the government efforts was impressive. By 1875, China had a new navy with 
two modern fleets, equipped with modern ships and Western training and management.
51 
There were also provincial naval forces in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, under the 
command of the Southern Sea Minister. By the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95, the total 
displacement tonnage of the Northern Sea Fleet alone had reached 53,394 metric tons.
52 Such 
progress was closely followed by western observers. In 1872, they reported that ‘Chinese 
military power was vastly different from what it had been in 1860’, ‘the output of factories 
and shipyards was impressive’, and ‘Chinese-built warships would soon equal the highest 
European standards’.
53
  State involvement in modern industry was not limited to arms. In 1884, another 26,000 
workers were on the government payroll, producing coal, copper, gold, silver, iron, steel and 
textiles which made the state the largest employee in the modern sector: 
 




  Investor  Workers employed  % in all 
 Foreigners  34,000  34.3 
 Chinese  65,000  65.7 
 (Private  28,000  28.3) 
 (State  37,000  37.4) 
 Total  99,000  100.0 
 
20 Thanks to the state initiatives, foreign control was not as overwhelming as in the railways. 
 
b. The Japanese invasion and the ‘One-Hundred-Day Reform’ 
 
  The fruit of the Westernisation Movement was brutally destroyed by the Japanese invasion 
of mainland Asia in 1894 as the very symbol of the Westernisation Movement–the Northern 
Sea Fleet–was defeated in a close match with heavy losses on both sides. The following 1895 
Maguan Treaty pushed China back to square one and the pattern associated with the Opium 
War repeated itself. This time, ‘later industrialisers’ – Japan, Germany and Russia – came in 
for the kill as seen from the 1896 Beijing (Peking) Treaty, the 1898 Fuzhou Concession 
Agreement, the 1898 Jiaozhou Bay Concession Treaty, and the 1898 Lü-Da Concession 
Treaty.  
  The Chinese radical, idealistic elite responded to this regression with the ‘One-Hundred-
Day Reform’. Instead of rebuilding China’s military strength, the edge of this reform was to 
modernise the state itself after the British model of constitutional monarchy to facilitate 
capitalist industrialisation. With the direct involvement of Emperor Guangxu (r. 1875–1908), 
the reformers master-minded a range of institutional changes including (1) appointing 
reformers to replace old mandarins in the government, (2) abandoning the traditional 
Imperial Examination for bureaucrat recruitment, (3) encouraging entrepreneurship and 
private investment in mining, manufacturing, transport and telecommunication, (4) 
establishing a central bank, (5) modernising state budgeting, (6) streamlining the armed 
forces, (7) upgrading modern education, (8) experimenting with freedom of speech and 
freedom of travelling overseas. With hindsight, these reforms were too far ahead of their time 
as these revolutionary changes have yet to be fully accomplished in contemporary China. 
  The reform created such a stir in the old Establishment, groups with vested interests under 
the banner of Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) launched a military coup with the support 
of China’s gentry class who were threatened to be made outcasts. The clock was then reset: 
China had no reform until 1911 when, à la the French 1789 model, Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolution ended the Qing monarchy. 
 
IV. CONSEQUENCE OF THE REFORMS AND STATE TRANSFORMATION 
 
21   Reforms and state transformation in Qing China originated from the trade of humble, 
contraband opium which triggered a long chain reaction for a century. Until 1910, the 
mercantilistic NTR was reasonably achieved. The Qing state benefited at least from the 
second budget, while the Chinese economy was boosted by the ‘Ricardian gains’ – the ‘vent 
for surplus’ type – from overseas trade, foreign capital, Western technology, and the rise in 
modern industries. Such gains certainly eased the pain of the erosion of China’s sovereignty. 
The pro-active, quasi-developmental Westernisation Movement marked a systematic attempt 
at ISI which demonstrated how far the state has been transformed. Heavy public spending on 
industrial projects was justified by the need for and fetish of modern arms. 
  However, these two reforms did not come about without problems, some fatal. The NTR 
was never popular among the public who saw the Qing state incompetent in keeping foreign 
powers at bay, especially Japan which China always despised culturally, politically and 
economically.
55  
  This resentment was refuelled by two marked consequences of rampant foreign trade. First, 
China’s terms of trade steadily deteriorated (see Figure 5). Second, there was chronic 
deflation of China’s silver currency. These two factors doubly discounted the relative price 
per unit of China’s exports. Thus, the mounting income from customs duties meant that much 
more domestic produce was required for exportation to make up the same revenue let alone 
an increasing one (see Table 6). 
 
Figure 5. Changes in China’s Terms of Trade
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  Moreover, despite the creation of a second budget, the reforming state did not touch the old 
tax system. Although the nominal rate maintained constant (see Table 6), as deflation 
worsened, ordinary households had to sell more in exchange for the same amount of cash to 
pay the tax. Thus, in the end, the real burden of Land–Poll Combined Tax must have 
increased three-fold. Now the very tax regime which helped China’s commercialisation 
earlier began to work against the state. In addition, during the post-Opium War period, extra 
surcharges were common which broke the political taboo against having a heavy tax burden. 
The Percentage Toll (lijin, or likin) – originally imposed in 1853 as a temporary measure for 
suppressing the Taiping rebels – was the most hateful of all. Hungry for funding, the 
Westernisation Movement activists only institutionalised the new taxes which proved 
counter-productive for the embryonic ‘developmental state’. The erosion of the state’s 
political and moral authority was shown by mass rebellions such as the anti-Manchu Nian 
(1852–68) and pro-Christian, anti-Confucian Taiping (1851–64) rebellions.  
 There was a financial explanation. By 1910, state access to China’s total GDP had 
increased from the early 1–2 percent to 16 percent,
57 unprecedented in Chinese history but 
still not enough to overturn China’s old economic structure in the given time. The 16 percent 
23 was not always guaranteed. Sweeping 15 farming provinces, the Taipings firmly controlled 
the most affluent southern region of the Empire – much of Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Hubei and Jiangxi. Meanwhile, the Nians haunted eight farming provinces in the north. The 
Taiping core area alone easily cost the Qing Treasury 34 percent of its agricultural revenue 
(as at 1849) and 49 percent of its customs duties (as at 1865, excluding Shanghai). The 
‘Dagger Society’ (xiandaohui), a close ally of the Taipings, captured Shanghai in 1853–54 
which jeopardised another one-third of the Qing customs duties.
58 To survive the state then 
became increasingly reliant on new taxes with political risks and pursued Western assistance 
in a dangerous liaison. This in turn alienated the state further from society. By 1910 there 
was a consensus among the masses that the Qing state was a traitor to China and its people. 
  As the ‘top-down’ reformers increasingly concentrated in a few cities with their agenda 
more and more isolated from that of the rest of the population, the 1898 ‘One-Hundred-Day 
Reform’, critical for fully-fledged modern state-hood, was aborted. This downfall was not 
because of external interference but due to internal crises accumulated gradually right from 
the beginning of the NTR as the benefits of reforms did not trickle down enough to enrich 
citizens at the grassroots level, especially in rural China. Not surprisingly, there was no 
public outcry against Cixi’s reactionary coup to end the ‘One-Hundred-Day Reform’. 
  Although China achieved some noticeable growth in the market during this period, its state 
transformation of the first round failed. But the Qing ‘state failure’ did not result from 
‘institutional sclerosis’ but from reforms’ negative externalities regarding socio-economic 
stability (currency deflation and tax burden) and national security (law and order, and 
sovereignty) so much so that the ‘social costs’ for the majority exceeded the ‘social benefits’ 




                                                 
ENDNOTES 
1 See Quan Hansheng, ‘Lielun Xinhanglu Faxianhoude Zhongguo Haiwai Maoyi’ (‘On China’s Overseas Trade 
after the Discovery of a New Asia-Europe Sea Route’), in Zhang Bincun and Liu Shiji (eds.) Zhongguo 
Haiyang Fazhanshi Lunwenji (Selected Essays on the Maritime History of China) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 
24                                                                                                                                                         
1993) vol. 5, pp. 11-12; C. J. A. Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade (Lange: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 
chs 1 and 3 and Appendix 11. 
2 See Huang Qichen, ‘Mingqing Guangdong Shangbang’ (‘Merchant Groups in Guangdong during the Ming–
Qing Period’), Zhongguo Shehui Jingjishi Yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Economic History) 4 (1992), 36; Yen-
P’ing Hao, ‘A ‘New Class’ in China’s Treaty Ports: The Rise of the Compradore-Merchants’, The Business 
History Review 4 (1970), 446–59; Yen-P’ing Hao, The Compradore in Nineteenth-Century China: Bridge 
between East and West (Harvard University Press, 1970). 
3 W. L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, reprint, (Manila: R. P. Garcia, 1985), pp. 63–4; Gungwu Wang, China 
and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), ch. 9. 
4 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 338; Anthony Reid, 
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680 (Yale University Press, 1993), p. 27. 
5 Gang Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities and Socio-economic Consequences, c. 2100 B.C. –1900 A.D. 
(London and West Port: Greenwood Press, 1997), Appendix C. 
6 Gang Deng, Development versus Stagnation: Technological Continuity and Agricultural Progress in 
Premodern China (London and West Port: Greenwood Press, 1993), pp. 19–20 and Appendix 1. 
7 Dwight Perkins, ‘Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: the Case of Nineteenth-Century China’, 
Journal of Economic History 27 (1967), pp. 478–92; cf. Albert Feuerwerker, ‘The State and the Economy in 
Late Imperial China’, Theory and Society 13 (1984), 300; Gang Deng, The Chinese Premodern Economy – 
Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist Sterility (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), Appendix 7. 
8 Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji ( Dynastic Data of China’s Households, 
Cultivated Land and Land Taxation) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1980), pp. 391, 394, 397, 398, 401, 
414–19. 
9 Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Half the World: the History and Culture of China and Japan (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1973), ch. 11. 
10 From 1842 to 1901, China signed in all 26 treaties for 73 concessions with 12 foreign powers including 
unilateral most-favoured-nation treatment for trade, consular jurisdiction, free access to the interior, permanent 
25                                                                                                                                                         
residency for foreigners, the right to deploy foreign armed forces, war reparations and territorial cessions. See 
Zhao Dexin (ed.), Zhongguo Jingjishi Cidian ( Dictionary of Chinese Economic History) (Wuhan: Hubei 
Dictionary Press, 1990), pp. 874–80). Between 1842 and 1900, China’s war reparation premiums totalled 713 
million liang of silver (26,600 metric tons), an equivalent to 22 times over the Qing annual revenue from 
agricultural taxes of the same period (Zhao, Dictionary of Chinese Economic History, pp. 874–80; Tang 
Xianglong,  Zhongguo Jindai Haiguan Shuishou He Fenpei Tongji ( Statistics of Customs Revenue and its 
Distribution in Modern China) (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1992), p. 33; Liang, Dynastic Data of China’s 
Households, Cultivated Land and Land Taxation, pp. 387, 397–8, 401, 415–16). China was broke and its 
geopolitical landscape was changed as the country became ‘zoned’ by foreign powers. See Hermann Kinder and 
Werner Hilgemann (eds.), The Penguin Atlas of World History (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 90. 
11 Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 54–60. 
12 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, p. 21. 
13 Source: Based on ZTBZ (Zhongguo Tielushi Bianji Yanjiu Zhongxin [Research Center of History of 
Railways in China]) (ed.), Zhongguo Tielu Dashiji,  1876–1995 ( Main Events in the History of Chinese 
Railways, 1876–1995) (Beijing: China’s Railway Press, 1996); Yang Yonggang, Zhongguo Jindai Tielushi (A 
History of Railways in Modern China) (Shanghai: Shanghai Books, 1997). 
14 Source: Based on ZTBZ, Main Events in the History of Chinese Railways; Yang, A History of Railways in 
Modern China. 
15 Based on Yang, A History of Railways in Modern China;  cf. Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic 
Performance in the Long Run (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 51. 
16 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 34–41. 
17 Source: Based on Zhou Boudi, Zhongguo Caizheng Shi (A History of State Finance in China) (Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Press, 1981), pp. 419–21, 426. 
18 Yie-chien Wang, ‘Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1639–1953’, in T. G. Rawski and L. M. Li (eds.), 
Chinese History in Economic Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp.  40–7. 
26                                                                                                                                                         
19 R. B. Marks, ‘Rice Prices, Food Supply, and Market Structure in Eighteenth-Century South China’, Late Imperial China 
2 (1991), 102. 
20 Source: Based on Liang, Dynastic Data of China’s Households, Cultivated Land and Land Taxation, pp. 10, 
253–4, 256–7, 264–7, 380, 400, 401, 414–8, 426; Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in 
Modern China, pp. 126–8. 
21 Mean values are applicable to Anhui (6.30%), Shaanxi (4.66%), Gansu (2.71%), Fujian (4.40%), Guangxi 
(1.32%), Yunnan (2.04%), Guizhou (0.49%). Jilin (0.09%) and Xinjiang (0.10) are based on the limited 
statistics from one year. Taiwan is excluded due to the absence of data. The formula is: P’i = 
 Pi
  ( 1 – n )   . Where 
P’i is the estimate for the period i; Pi, the incomplete aggregate for population of the period i; n, the combined 
share of the missing provinces in China’s total. 
22 Lin Manhong, ‘Zhongguode Baiyin Wailiu Yu Shijie Jinyin Jianchan [1814–1850]’ (‘China’s Silver Outflow 
and Decline in Gold and Silver Outputs in the World [1814–1850]’), in Wu Jianxiong (ed.), Zhongguo Haiyang 
Fazhanshi Lunwenji (Selected Essays on the Maritime History of China), vol. 4, (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 
1991), pp. 234–6. 
23 Chen Ciyu, ‘Yi Zhong Yin Ying Sanjiao Maoyi Wei Jizhou Tantao Shijiu Shiji Zhongguode Duiwai Maoyi’ 
(‘Study of Nineteenth Century Sino-foreign Trade based on the Trade Triangle of China, India and Britain’), in 
Editing Committee for Maritime History of China (ed.), Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhanshi Lunwenji (Selected 
Essays on the Maritime History of China), vol. 1, (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1984), pp. 156–7. 
24 Source: Based on Lin, ‘China’s Silver Outflow and Decline in Gold and Silver Outputs in the World [1814–
1850]’, 30–5. 
25 Yan Zhongping (ed.), Zhongguo Jindai Jingji Tongji Ziliao Xuanji (Selected Statistical Data for Modern 
China’s Economy) (Beijing: Sciences Press, 1953), p. 60. 
26 Before the Opium War, the stated export duty was four percentent and import duty 1.6 percent which made 
an average rate of the duties at 2.8 percent. See Sun Xugang (ed.), Jianming Zhongguo Caizhengshi ( A 
Compact History of Finance of Premodern China) (Beijing: China’s Finance and Economy Press, 1988), p. 
190.  
27                                                                                                                                                         
27 Sun, A Compact History of Finance of Premodern China, p. 204. 
28 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 69–78. 
29 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, p. 23. 
30 Source: Based on Chi-Keung Leung, ‘China: Railway Patterns and National Goals’, Research Paper No. 195 
(1980), Department of Geography, University of Chicago, p. 36; Chen Dunyi and Hu Jishan (eds.), Zhongguo 
Jingji Dili (Economic Geography of China) (Beijing: Zhanwang Press, 1983), p. 21.  
31 Source: Based on Leung, ‘China: Railway Patterns and National Goals’, 61; Chen and Hu, Economic 
Geography of China, pp. 23, 322. 
32 As at 1894, based on Sun Shutang, Zhongguo Jindai Gongyeshi Ziliao (Materials on Modern Industries in 
China) (Beijing: Science Press, 1957), p. 1202. 
33 Given that the capital–worker ratio is much higher in heavy industry, the investment share for this sector must 
be much higher. 
34 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, pp. 969, 1195. 
35 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, pp. 1068, 1197. 
36 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, p. 1201. 
37 Kaoru Sugihara, ‘Intra-Asian Trade and East Asia’s Industrialisation, 1919–1939’, Working Papers in 
Economic History 44 (1998), London School of Economics and Political Science, pp. 25–57. 
38 By 1855, Shanghai had become China’s leading trading port whose total export value to Britain was nearly 
seven times that of Guangzhou’s. See Cao Tunyu, ‘Ningbo Shanghaigangde Lishi Guiji Yu Xiandai Fazhan 
Qushi’ (‘Developmental Trend of Port Ningbo and Port Shanghai, Past and Present’), Zhejiang Shehui Kexue 
(Social Sciences in Zhejiang) 6 (1995), 93. 
39 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, p. 21. 
40 Source: Based on Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 126–9, 
139–44, 170–3. 
41 Tang, Statistics of Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 32–3. 
28                                                                                                                                                         
42 Hao Peiyun, Zhongguo Haijun Shi (A Naval History of Modern China) (Beiping: Xuewu Books, 1929), pp. 
8–9. 
43 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, p. 1188. 
44 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, p. 279. 
45 M. C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 212. 
46 Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, p. 293. 
47 Hao, A Naval History of Modern China, pp. 17, 65, 71, 167. 
48 Anon, Regulations of the Northern Sea Fleet, pp. 179–97. 
49 Anon, Regulations of the Northern Sea Fleet), pp. 199–204. 
50 Hao, A Naval History of Modern China, pp. 13, 20, 45, 159, 170–1. 
51 Xia Zhengnong (ed.), Cihai (Encyclopaedia) (Shanghai: Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1989), pp. 157, 382. 
52 Anon, Regulations of the Northern Sea Fleet, pp. 1–118. 
53 Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, p. 220. 
54 Sun, Materials on Modern Industries in China, p. 1201. 
55 In effect, in post-Opium War China, most of mass protests and revolutions were in one way or another related 
to Japan’s aggressions. 
56 Source: Based on Wang Jingyu, ‘Qianyi Jindai Zhongwai Jingji Guanxide Pingjia Wenti’ (‘On Evaluation of 
Sino-Foreign Trade Relationship’), Jindaishi Yanjiu (Study of Modern History) 1 (1991), 1–27. 
57 The traditional share was 1–2 percent. The tax in cash with silver deflation made up an extra six percent and 
the growth in customs revenue another eight percent (see Table 6). 
58 Liang, Dynastic Data of China’s Households, Cultivated Land and Land Taxation, p. 415; Tang, Statistics of 
Customs Revenue and its Distribution in Modern China, pp. 69–78. 
29 